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We investigate whether social capital affects tax avoidance activities. Using a sample of 
52,962 firm-year observations over the 1990-2014 period, we document that social 
capital is significantly and negatively associated with tax avoidance. Specifically, we find 
that higher social capital reduces the propensity to undertake tax sheltering activities. 
This result is robust to using different proxies for tax avoidance as well as to including 
controls for CEO characteristics, and quality of corporate governance. Our evidence is 
consistent with the idea that: i) managers regard corporate tax payments as a socially 
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Does social capital constrain firms’ tax avoidance? 
 
1. Introduction 
Social capital is defined, in economics and sociology literature, as a shared set of 
believes that facilitates norm-consistent behaviors and constrains norm-deviant 
behaviors. Social capital facilitates honest dealings among parties in transactions by 
imposing a reputational loss on parties that are dishonest. Consistent with this argument, 
extant research suggests that social capital is negatively associated with opportunistic 
behaviors, property crimes, and transaction costs (La Porta et al., 1997; Guisio et al., 
2004; Buonanno et al., 2009).  Moreover, building on social norm and legitimacy 
theories, prior literature shows that the level of social capital of the geographical area in 
which a firm is located affects corporations’ decisions. This is because firms seek to 
establish congruence between their activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the 
larger social system of which they are a part (Downling and Pfeffer 1975). In line with 
these arguments, Jha and Chen (2015) document that firms headquartered in high social 
capital regions are trustworthy in the eyes of their auditors, while Jha (2013) and Jin et al. 
(2015) show that they have better quality financial reports.  
We aim at contributing to the emerging literature that links a community’s social 
capital to the economic decisions of local corporations headquartered in that community 
by focusing on a more controversial issue. Specifically, we analyze whether the level of 
social capital of the region in which a firm is headquartered affects its tax avoidance 
activities. 
Recent anecdotal and academic evidence points toward a fervid debate around 































































corporate tax payments. Some stakeholders of public companies consider tax avoidance 
as a socially irresponsible and illegitimate activity (Lanis and Richardson, 2012) while 
others deem corporate tax payments as detrimental to social welfare because they hurt 
innovation, production, job creation, and economic development (Devis et al., 2016).  
Christensen and Murphy (2004, p. 37) argue that paying taxes is the most 
fundamental way in which firms engage with the broader society and Lanis and 
Richardson (2012) add that managerial actions aimed at solely minimizing corporate 
taxes through tax aggressive activities involve significant ethical issues. Thus, if 
companies do not pay a “fair share’’ of corporate taxes to the government, to ensure the 
financing of public goods, they avoid a social obligation (Freedman, 2003; Freise et al., 
2008). On the other hand, some authors (see Davis et al., 2016) point out that tax 
payments reduce firms’ net income, which in turn makes it more difficult for firms to 
have a positive impact on society through infrastructure investment and job creation, as 
well as by improving the income level of the community through employee salaries and 
payments to suppliers. This viewpoint is supported by research in economics that shows 
how corporate taxes tend to decrease investment and entrepreneurship (Hines, 2006; 
Djankov, 2008). 
In this paper, we combine these two perspectives on tax avoidance with prior 
research on social capital and investigate whether social capital constrains firms’ tax 
avoidance activities. The direction of the relation between social capital and tax 
avoidance depends on whether managers consider tax avoidance as a socially responsible 
practice. Given the presence of contrasting theories on the desirability of corporate tax 
avoidance policies, we tackle this research question from an empirical viewpoint. 































































We use Wilson’s (2009) tax sheltering probability to capture the incidence of tax 
avoidance practices and we measure social capital at the county level using publicly 
available data from the Northeast Regional Centre for Rural Development (NRCRD) at 
the Pennsylvania State University. Using a large sample of 52,962 firm-year observations 
over the period 1990-2014, we document that firms headquartered in areas with high 
social capital engage significantly less in tax avoidance activities. This is consistent with 
the idea that, on average, managers regard corporate tax payments as a socially 
responsible action. Specifically, our results suggest that, in order to establish congruence 
between the social values implied by their companies and the norms of acceptable 
behavior required by the social system of which they are a part, managers of firms 
incorporated in regions with high social capital are less likely to engage in activity aimed 
at reducing corporate tax payments. This result is robust to using different proxies for tax 
avoidance as well as to controlling for State fixed effects to eliminate possible 
confounding trends due to different taxation systems among U.S. States. Moreover, 
conclusions are not affected by including controls for CEO characteristics (such as career 
concerns and gender), and quality of corporate governance. In additional analyses we 
show that the negative effect of social capital on tax avoidance is significantly stronger in 
regions with high religiosity, in well performing firms, which do not have pressure to 
engage in tax planning to boost earnings, and in the presence of lower CEO incentive 
compensation. Overall results reported in the paper provide solid evidence that the level 
of social capital of the area in which a company is headquartered constraints its tax 
avoidance activities.  































































Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend research 
on social capital (Jha and Chen, 2015; Jha, 2013; Jin et al., 2015; Guiso et al. 2004; Jha 
and Cox, 2015) and, more broadly, research on the effect of the social environment on 
managerial decisions (Hilary and Hui 2009, McGuire et al. 2012, Callen et al. 2016; 
Chircop et al., forthcoming). Together with Jha and Chen (2015), this study is among the 
few in accounting, finance, and business literature to examine the role of social capital on 
the firms’ behavior. Second, we make an important contribution to tax avoidance 
literature by showing that the social capital of the region where the firm is headquartered 
affects tax avoidance activities. In doing so we enrich our knowledge of the determinants 
of corporate tax avoidance and corroborate preliminary findings that the social 
environment plays a role in tax planning decisions (Boone et al., 2013). Third, we 
contribute to the recent debate on companies’ perception of the desirability of tax 
avoidance activities from a social viewpoint (Davis et al. 2016). Although results in 
Davis et al., (2016) cast doubt on the idea that the payment of corporate taxes is 
considered socially ethical and responsible, we find evidence that in geographic areas in 
which trust and altruism are predominant, firms engage less in tax avoidance activities. 
Our results suggest that paying a fair amount of taxes is the socially responsible thing for 
companies to do.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and develops 
our research hypothesis; Section 3 presents the research design, sample selection and 
descriptive statistics; Section 4 discusses our main findings; Section 5 presents sseveral 
robustness tests; Section 6 introduces further analyses in which we conduct a series of 
cross-sectional tests and Section 7 concludes. 































































2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Social Capital 
Social capital refers to norms and networks that facilitate collective actions 
(Woolcock, 2001). This definition combines two distinct but complementary views of 
social capital: the economics view that defines social capital as a “norm” inducing 
cooperative and efficient behaviour within a social structure through trust (Guisio et al., 
2004; Portes, 1998; Fukuyama, 1997) and the management view that models social 
capital as a set of “networks” that benefit participants (Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001; Payne 
et al., 2011). 
These two approaches are strictly related to each other. Fukuyama (1997) notes 
that in a dense network, there are repeated activities in which people rely on each other. 
Over time, this leads to a societal code of conduct that encourages the propensity to honor 
obligations and develop mutual trust. Portes (1998) argues that, over time, these morals 
get passed from one generation to another and get internalized into society. 
Consequently, people feel obliged to behave in a certain way. Social capital facilitates 
honest dealings among parties in transactions by imposing a reputational loss on parties 
that are dishonest. Coleman (1990) and Spagnolo (1999) posit that a strong social 
network enhances the punishment for deviant behavior and encourages good behavior. In 
high-social capital communities people trust each other more because the network in their 
community provides a better opportunity to punish deviants. At the same time, in these 
communities’ people may rely more on others' keeping their promises because of the 
moral attitude imprinted with education (Guisio et al., 2004). 































































Extant research also shows that social capital is negatively associated with 
opportunistic behavior, such as lower corruption (La Porta et al., 1997), lower property 
crime (Buonanno et al., 2009), and lower transaction costs (Guisio et al., 2004). 
Moreover, social capital induces individuals to divert fewer resources to protecting 
themselves from criminal violation of their property rights (Knack and Keefer, 1997).  
Social capital does not only affect individuals’ behaviour but it is also likely to 
influence corporations’ decisions. Indeed, both legitimacy and social norm theory support 
the view that the level of social capital of the geographical area in which a firm is located 
affects the firm’s behavior. Specifically, the legitimacy theory suggests that there is a 
need for firms to establish ‘congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by [organizational] activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger 
social system of which they are a part’ (Downling and Pfeffer 1975, p. 122). The social 
norm theory, instead, posits that the norms of the local population in which the 
organization is established will influence management since the local population is an 
important element of the environment in which managers live and operate (Kohlberg, 
1984; Sunstein, 1996, Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004 and McGuire et al., 2011). Moreover, 
such influence on management is amplified by the need of organizations to maintain 
organizational legitimacy. Consistent with these arguments extant research provides 
robust evidence that organizations headquartered in high social capital regions are 
trustworthy in the eyes of their auditors (Jha and Chen, 2015), have better quality 
financial reports (Jha, 2013; Jin et al., 2015), are less likely to issue a restatement (Jin et 
al., 2005), have better access to credit (Guiso et al., 2004), and exhibit a higher level of 
CSR (Jha and Cox, 2015).  































































Building on social capital research that portrays firms headquartered in areas with 
high social capital as more altruistic and honest, in this paper we focus on a more 
controversial issue: does social capital constrain firms’ tax avoidance activities?  
 
2.2 Social Capital and Tax Avoidance 
Although the amount of tax paid by companies is not entirely voluntary, managers 
do make choices regarding the extent to which their firms engage in tax planning 
activities aimed at reducing tax payments (Davis et al., 2016). Prior research shows that 
firm-level characteristics such as capital structure, foreign operations, firm performance 
(Rego, 2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997), compensation incentives (Rego and Wilson, 
2012; Phillips, 2003; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006) as well as ownership structures 
(Klassen, 1997; Chen et al, 2010; McGuire et al., 2011) have a significant impact on 
corporate tax avoidance. 
1
 However, despite these findings we still have an incomplete 
understanding of why some firms are more tax aggressive than others (Shackelford and 
Shelvin, 2001; Shelvin, 2007). In this paper, we argue that a possible unexplored 
determinant of tax avoidance is the level of social capital of the geographic location 
where the firm is headquartered. The direction of the relation between social capital and 
tax avoidance depends on whether managers consider tax avoidance as a socially 
responsible activity. There is a debate around the desirability of corporate tax payments 
from a social viewpoint, with evidence suggesting that some stakeholders consider tax 
avoidance as a socially irresponsible and illegitimate activity (Lanis and Richardson, 
2012), while others deem corporate tax payments as potentially detrimental to social 
                                                        
1
 For an extensive review of accounting and finance studies on tax research refer to Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) 
































































Christensen and Murphy (2004, p. 37) claim that “tax revenues are the lifeblood 
of the social contract” and that paying taxes is perhaps the most fundamental way in 
which firms engage with the broader society. Managerial actions aimed at solely 
minimizing corporate taxes through tax aggressive activities involve significant ethical 
issues (Lanis and Richardson, 2012). Indeed, when a company engages in tax avoidance 
policies pursued to maximize post-tax income, it is viewed as not paying its ‘‘fair share’’ 
of corporate taxes to the government to ensure the financing of public goods (Freedman, 
2003; Freise et al., 2008). Avoiding tax is thus avoiding a social obligation. Tax 
avoidance can make a company vulnerable to accusations of greed and selfishness, 
damaging its reputation and destroying the public's trust. 
2
 Consistent with this view, 
Lanis and Richardson (2012) argue that tax avoidance should be considered socially 
irresponsible as it clearly violates acceptable social norms. By not engaging in tax 
avoidance, a company can gain legitimacy within society and maintain good-standing 
with the tax authority by complying with and following the underlying spirit of the tax 
law (Christensen and Murphy, 2004; Ostas, 2004; Rose, 2007). From this perspective, 
given the altruistic and honest behaviors promoted and facilitated by social capital, we 
would expect a negative association between social capital and firms’ tax avoidance 
activities.  
An alternative perspective is provided by Davis et al. (2016). Specifically, Davis 
et al. (2016, p. 52) claim that firms may “view paying taxes as detracting from social 
                                                        
2 Margaret Hodge, the U.K chairman of Public Accounts Committee, recently accused Google, Amazon 
and Starbucks of siphoning profits away from Britain by using a complex web of accounting strategies that 
are labelled as cynical and unjust. Hodge said: “We are not accusing you of being illegal, we are accusing 
you of being immoral.” Starbucks' royalty rate used to be 6% of sales, but was recently reduced to 4.7% 
after being challenged by the UK tax authorities. 































































welfare because tax payments reduce innovation, job growth, and economic 
development”. The underlying idea is that as net income increases, a firm is more likely 
to have a positive impact on society through infrastructure investment and job creation, as 
well as by improving the income level of the community through employee salaries and 
payments to suppliers (Davis et al., 2016). This argument is in line with theoretical and 
empirical studies in economics that show that corporate taxes tend to decrease investment 
and entrepreneurship (Hines, 2006; Djankov, 2008) and it is reinforced by research 
showing that the private sector uses resources more efficiently than the public sector 
(McGee, 2010 and Lantos, 2001). Thus, keeping resources in corporations is seen as 
beneficial to society (McGee, 2010). If companies consider engaging in tax avoidance 
activities as a means to promote social welfare through increased innovation, job growth 
and economic development, we would expect to observe a positive association between 
social capital and corporate tax avoidance. 
Given the presence of contrasting theories on the desirability of corporate tax 
avoidance policies from a social welfare viewpoint, we posit the following non-
directional hypothesis: 
 
H1: Social capital is associated with corporate tax avoidance 
 
3. Research design, sample selection and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Measuring tax avoidance 
Given our focus, we are interested in capturing aggressive tax avoidance 
practices. Some prior literature has used actual identified instances of aggressive tax 































































behaviour. For example Mills (1998) and Mills and Sansing (2000) have used IRS tax 
audit adjustments as proxies for non-complicance, Lisowsky (2010) and Lisowsky et al. 
(2013) have used firms’ Form 8886 or IRS Schedule M-3 to identify disclosures relating 
to tax sheltering, while Graham and Tucker (2006) have used public disclosures of tax 
sheltering. Studies based on such approaches for the identification of extreme tax 
avoidance, while providing a clean identification strategy, are suscptible to selection bias 
and endogeneity issues (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
To address such limitations, using publicly disclosed sheltering cases, Wilson 
(2009) developed several empirical models which predict the degree to which firms 
engage in tax sheltering activities. These models predicting the incidence of tax 
sheltering have been validated by Kim et al. (2011) and Rego and Wilson (2012). 
Further, tax sheltering as predicted by Wilson (2009) models has been found to be 
associated with stock price crash risk (Kim et al. 2011) and the sensitivity of manager’s 
compensation to stock return volatility (Rego and Wilson, 2012). Following, Hoi et al. 
(2013) and Kim et al. (2011) we use the following model, which corresponds to the 
model reported in Table 5, Column 3 of Wilson (2009), to calculate the propensity to 
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where, SHELTER_PROBAB is the propensity of a firm to undertake tax sheltering 
activities; BTD is the book-to-tax difference; DA is discretionary accruals from a 
modified cross-sectional Jones Model, AT is the log of total assets; ROA is return on 
assets; Foreign Income is an indicator variable which equals 1 for years in which the firm 
reports foreign income, and 0 otherwise; and R&D is research and development 
expenditure scaled by lagged total assets. All variables are described in greater detail in 
Appendix 1. We use the standardized transformation of SHELTER_PROPBAB, 
SHELTER, in our empirical analyses. 
 
3.2 Measuring social capital 
As our measure of social capital we use the social capital index developed by 
Rupasingha and Goetz (2008), which is publicly available at the Northeast Regional 
Center for Rural Development (NERCRD).
3
 The authors use two measures of social 
norms and two measures of networks, and use the first component of a principle 
component analysis as the social capital index at the county level. The two measures of 
social norms used are voter turnout in presidential elections and the census response rate, 
while the two measures of network used are the number of social and civic associations 
and the number of nongovernmental organisations. The higher the social capital index in 
a county the higher the trust in that particular county. Rupasingha and Goetz (2008)’s 
measure of social capital ‘is the most comprehensive measure of social capital at the 
county level’ (Jha and Chen 2015, p.617) and has been used in numerous studies among 
which Deller and Deller (2010), Hopkins (2011) and Jha and Chen (2015). Given that the 
                                                        
3
 The Social Capital index for years 1990, 1997, 2005 and 2009 is available at the Northeast Regional 
Center for Rural Development (NERCRD) website: http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/social-capital-
resources 































































social capital index is available for 1990, 1997, 2005 and 2009, similar to Jha and Chen 
(2015), we interpolate and extrapolate the index for missing sampled years. Further 
details on this measure are available in Appendix 1. 
 
3.3 Empirical model 
To study the association between social capital and tax avoidance we use a 
multivariate OLS model in which the dependent variable is SHELTER and the main 
independent variable of interest is social capital (SK) (Equation 2). The coefficient of 
interest is )*which indicates the direction and magnitude of the association between 
social capital and tax avoidance.   
 
+, = -+ + )*.+, +/)01 $! 23+, + 4+, 
(2) 
 
where, Controls refers to the vector of variables included in the baseline regression to 
control for different firm characteristics which prior literature (e.g. Gupta and Newberry, 
1997; Rego, 2003; Graham and Tucker, 2006; Frank et al., 2009; Wilson, 2009) have 
shown to be significantly associated with tax avoidance. Specifically, we control for 
discretionary accruals (DA) which have been shown to be positively related to aggressive 
tax avoidance (Frank et al., 2009); institutional ownership (IO) to capture the impact of 
corporate governance on tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009); profitability 
(ROA, NOL and CHG_NOL); liquidity (CASH); firm size (EMP and  SIZE); growth 
opportunities (CHG_SALE and MB); leverage (LEV); and other firm charcteristics (FI, 































































PPE, INTANG EQINC and R&D). Further, to ensure that our measure of social capital 
does not capture the effect of other county characteristics on tax avoidance we control for 
the percentage of the county population over 25 years of age with a university degree 
(EDU); the median household income for the county (INC); the within county poverty 
rate (POV); and the county population (POP). All varaibles are defined in greater detail 
in Appendix 1. Further, we include year fixed effects and use 2-digit SIC codes to control 
for industry fixed effects. Finally, we cluster standard errors by year. To mitiage any 
impact outliers might have on our results we winsorize all continuous variables at the 5% 
level over all observations in our sample. 
 
3.4 Sample 
Our sample period consists of firm years for the period 1990 to 2014. We start in 
1990 as it is the first year for which we have social capital index data. We start with 
153,938 firm year observations for which we have county and state information. Similar 
to Jha and Chen (2015) we drop utilities (7,216 observations) and financials (16,898 
observations). Subsequently, we drop observations for which data to calculate all 
independent variables is not available and observations for which data to calculate 
SHELTER is not available (2,037 observations) and end up with a final sample of 52,962 
observations for 7,785 firms. As shown in Table 1, we have a similar number of 
observations in each year of our sample period, with the highest (lowest) number of 
observations in 1998 (2011) with 2,506 (1,762) observations. 
 
<<Insert Table 1 around here>> 
































































3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 show the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical 
model. These results are generally in line with prior literature. Specifically, SK for our 
sample has a mean of -0.58 and a standard deviation of 0.81. The corresponding figures 
in Jha and Chen (2015) are -0.50 and 0.91, respectively. In Table 3, we present the 
Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical model. These univariate 
statistics suggest that social capital is negatively associated with tax avaoidance as 
evident from the significant (at the 5% level) negative correlation between SK and 
SHELTER. Further SK is significantly negatively correlated with DA, LEV, NOL, FI and 
R&D suggesting that companies with high social capital are less risky. Further, high 
social capital firms tend to be smaller, as evident by the negative correlation between SK 
and both SIZE and EMP, and undertake less investment, as evident by the negative 
correlation between SK and PPE and INTANG. Finally, the positive correlation between 
SK and both ROA and EQINC suggest that high social capital firms tend to be better 
performing and have higher equity income.  
 
<<Insert Tables 2 and 3 around here>> 
 
4. Main Findings 
Table 4 shows the results when we run Equation 2 for our sample. We find that 
social capital is significantly and negatively associated with tax avoidance. Specifically, 
we find that higher social capital decreases the propensity to undertake tax sheltering 































































activities. This association is evident from the negative coefficiet, significant at the 1% 
level, on SK. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficient on SK, results reported in Table 
4 suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in SK results in a 126 basis points 
decrease in the propensity to undertake tax sheltering activities, SHELTER.
4
 Findings 
reported in Table 4 provide evidence that the social environment in which firms operate 
affects managerial decisions. Specifically, the negative association between tax 
avoidance and social capital indicates that corporate tax payments are generally regarded 
as a desirable outcome from a social viewpoint, and when firms are incorporated in 
geographical areas that promote honest and altruistic behaviors they engage less in 
activities aimed at minimizing corporate taxes.  
In line with expecations we find a significant positive association between 
independent variables that proxy for both risk and complexity, and SHELTER. 
Specifically, we find that DA, LEV, NOL, FI and INTANG are all significantly and 
positively associated with our dependent variable. We also find that, as evident by the 
significant and positive coefficients on SIZE and EMP, the larger the company the higher 
the incidence of undertaking tax sheltering activities. Further, the significant and negative 
coefficients on CASH, ROA and CHG_SALE suggest that better firm performance is 
associated with less tax sheltering activities. 
 
<<Insert Table 4 around here>> 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
                                                        
4 Economic significance is calculated as (0.805 x -0.016 x 100)=1.26% 































































We subject our results to a series of robustness tests. First, to ensure that our 
results are not driven by the choice of proxy used to measure tax avoidance, we substitute 
SHELTER in Equation 2 with two alternative proxies for tax avoidance. Second, given 
that state idiosyncratic characteristics such as state levelled taxes and state institutions 
may influence the relationship between social capital and tax avoidance we add state 
fixed effects to Equation 2. Third, we include additional controls in Equation 2 to 
examine the robustness of our results when we control for CEO characteristics and 
corporate governance. 
 
5.1 Alternative measures of tax avoidance 
To ensure that our results are not driven by our selection of proxy for tax 
avoidance, we substitute SHELTER with two other commonly used proxies for tax 
avoidance. Our first alternate proxy to SHELTER is the Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
discretionary book-tax difference, DD_BT. The second alternate proxy to SHELTER is 
the cash effective tax rate, CETR, which captures the consequences of tax avoidances 
practices. These proxies are described in greater detail in Appendix 1. A large (small) 
DD_BT (CETR) suggests greater incidence of tax avoidance activities. Given this, when 
we substitute these alternative measures with SHELTER in Equation 2 we expect a 
significant negative (positive) coefficient on SK when DD_BT (CETR) is the dependent 
variable. In this analysis we lose a number of observations due to missing data required to 
construct the alternate proxies for tax avoidance. 
Consistent with results reported in Table 4, Table 5 shows a significant negative 
(positive) coefficient on SK when DD_BT (CETR) is the dependent variable. Specifically, 































































the negative association between SK and DD_BT is signficant at the 5% level while the 
positive association between SK and CETR is significant at the 1% level. These results 
suggest that the observed negative relationship between social capital and tax avoidance 
is not driven by the choice of proxy for tax avoidance. 
 
<<Insert Table 5 around here>> 
 
5.2 State fixed effects 
The multileveled U.S. government system entails that taxes are levied at both the 
central (‘federal’) and lower levels of government (‘state’). Prior academic literature (e.g. 
Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002; Devereux et al., 2007) has shown that the interaction 
between taxes levelled at different levels of government leads to externalities which have 
real economic effects on firms. To try to address the presence of such externalities and 
the impact of the hetereogenous nature of the state level regulatory framework on our 
results, we introduce in Equation 2 state fixed effects. Table 6 shows the results of this 
analysis. In line with our prior results, we find a negative and significant (at the 1% level) 
association between social capital and tax avoidance suggesting that our prior results are 
not driven by differences in the regulatory framework at the state level.  
 



































































5.3 Additional controls 
To ensure that our measure of social capital is not capturing attributes of the 
sampled firms’ CEO we introduce variables in our model to control for CEO career 
concerns and gender. These controls are important since Dyreng et al. (2010) suggest that 
CEOs influence firm tax avoidance activity. Moreover, prior literature has established a 
link between CEO attributes and corporate risk taking (e.g. Serfling, 2014; Faccio et al., 
2016; Sila et al. 2016). Given that tax avoidance activities are inherently risky, since if 
identified may lead to regulatory and public sanctions, if social capital captures these 
CEO attributes, it may bias our results. We introduce in Equation 2 CEO age (AGE) to 
proxy for CEO career concerns and an indicator variable (FEMALE) which takes the 
value of 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise. Table 7 shows the results of this 
analysis. Specifically, we find that the relationship between social capital and tax 
avoidance is robust to controlling for CEO attributes as evident by the significant and 
negative coefficient on SK. Since CEO characteristics are only available for a sub-sample 
of firms, results reported in Table 7 are based on a significantly smaller sample. 
 
<<Insert Table 7 around here>> 
 
A firm characteristic which may also be influenced by the norms in which the 
company operates is corporate governance. Specifically, the same norms which influence 
the social capital of the firm may also influence the corporate governance of the firm. 
Moreover, prior literature has found mixed results on the association between firm 
corporate governance and tax avoidance activity (e.g. Minnick and Noga, 2010; Rego and 































































Wilson, 2012; Robinson et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 2015). To ensure that social 
capital is not caputring characteristics of the corporate governance of the firm, we adjust 
Equation 2 to control for corporate governance. We use data from MSCI ESG KLD 
STATS about the total number of corporate governance strengths and controversies to 
construct an indicator variable, HIGH_CGOV, which takes the value of 1 of the net 
number of corporate governance strengths is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. 
As shown in Table 8, we find that the previously observed relationship between social 
capital and tax avoidance is robust to the inclusion of a control for corporate governance. 
Also in this case, limited data availability significantly reduces the sample. 
 
<<Insert Table 8 around here>> 
 
6. Further analyses 
In this section we extend our results and conduct a series of cross-sectional tests 
to identify the settings in which the negative relationship between social capital and tax 
avoidance is strongest.  
 
6.1 Religiosity 
Prior literature has established a link between religious adherence of the area in 
which the company is headquartered and operates, and lower risk taking (Hilary and Hui, 
2009; Li et al., 2013; Adhikari and Aggrawal, 2016, Chircop et al., 2016). For example, 
companies operating in religious areas have lower incidences of financial reporting 
irregularities and lower earnings management (Kanagaretnam et al., 2015; Lievenbruck 































































and Schmid, 2014; McGuire et al., 2011: Dyreng et al., 2012). Given this, we expect that 
the influence of social capital on tax avoidance should be stronger in religious areas, 
where religious norms complement norms related to trust perpetuated by high social 
capital. 
To be able to examine whether the relationship between social capital and tax 
avoidance varies in the presence of high religiosity, we use data from the American 
Religion Data Archive (ARDA) survey to construct a measure of religiosity. Specifically, 
we use the percentage of the population who are members of a religious denomination in 
the county in which the company is headquartered. Subsequently, we construct an 
indicator variable, REL, which takes the value of 1 for those firms for which our measure 
of religiosity is above median and 0 otherwise. We interact SK with REL to examine the 
impact of high religiosity on the association between social capital and tax avoidance. 
We show the results of this analysis in Table 9. Specifically, we find that the 
incremental effect of high religiosity on the relationship between SK and SHELTER is 
significant and negative. This result suggests that the negative relationship between social 
capital and tax avoidance is signficantly stronger in the presence of high religiosity. 
 
<<Insert Table 9 around here>> 
 
6.2 Firm performance 
Univariate results shown in Table 3 suggest that there is a significant positive 
correlation between SK and ROA suggesting a positive relationship between social capital 
and firm performance. Firms with high levels of performance have possibly lower 































































incentives to undertake risky tax avoidance activities. In a similar vein, Goh et al. (2016) 
find that firms undertaking tax avoidance practices have lower cost of capital thus less 
need to sustain a high return on assets. This discussion suggests that the negative 
relationship between social capital and tax avoidance should be stronger in high 
performance companies. 
To examine this relationship, we transform ROA in an indicator variable, 
HIGH_ROA which takes the value of 1 if above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. We 
interact this indicator variable with SK to measure the incremental effect of high 
performance. We show the results of this analysis in Table 10. In line with our 
expectations we find, that the negative relationship between SK and SHELTER is stronger 
for firms with high profitability. 
  
<<Insert Table 10 around here>> 
 
6.3 Incentive-based compensation 
Prior literature (e.g. Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Low, 2009) has established a 
positive relationship between equity based compensation and risk taking. Specifically, it 
has been found that firm risk taking increases with the CEO’s compensation sensitivty to 
changes in stock price. Moreover, Rego and Wilson (2012 p.806) find ‘that greater equity 
risk incentives are associated with higher tax risk’. Given this, we predict that the 
observed negative relationship between social capital and tax avoidance should be 
stronger when the CEO compensation is less sensitive to stock prices. In these instances 































































engaging in tax avoidance activities is not only seen negatively by society, but the CEO 
has also less personal incentives to undertake tax avoidance practices.  
To examine this prediction, we construct an indicator variable, 
HIGH_CASHCOMP, which takes the value of 1 if the ratio of cash compensation (the 
sum of salary and bonus payments) to total compensation is above the sample median and 
0 otherwise. We also interact SK with HIGH_CASHCOMP to study whether the 
relationship between social capital and tax avoidance is incrementally negative in the 
presence of high CEO cash compensation.  
Table 11 shows the results of this analysis. In line with our predictions, we find 
that the interaction term is negative and significant (at the 10% level) suggesting that the 
previously observed negative relationship between social capital and tax avoidance is 
stronger when CEO compensation is less sensitive to stock volatility. Interestingly, we 
find that the negative coefficient on SK stays signficant suggesting that social capital 
constrains tax avoidance activities irrespective of CEO compensation structure. 
 
<<Insert Table 11 around here>> 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the level of social capital of the region in which a 
firm is headquartered affects its tax avoidance activities. Social capital can be defined as 
the mutual trust in society and literature shows that firms headquartered in high social 
capital regions are trustworthy in the eyes of their auditors (Jha and Chen, 2015), have 
better quality financial reports (Jha, 2013; Jin et al., 2015), less likelihood of restatement 
(Jin et al., 2005), better access to credit (Guiso et al., 2004), and exhibit higher level of 































































corporate social responsibility (Jha and Cox, 2015).  Recent research suggests that some 
stakeholders of public companies consider tax avoidance as a socially irresponsible and 
illegitimate activity (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Hodge, 2013) while others deem 
corporate tax payments as detrimental to social welfare because they hurt innovation, 
production, job creation, and economic development (Devis et al., 2016). Building on this 
debate, we use a sample of 52,962 firm-year observations over the period 1990-2014 to 
empirically investigate the relationship between social capital and tax avoidance.  
Consistent with the idea that managers consider corporate tax payments as a 
socially responsible action, we find robust evidence that firms headquartered in areas 
with high social capital engage significantly less in tax avoidance activities. This result is 
robust to using different proxies of tax avoidance, to controlling for CEO’s characteristics 
and quality of corporate governance, and to including state fixed effects in the regression 
models. Moreover, in subsequent cross-sectional tests, we document that the negative 
impact of social capital on tax avoidance is stronger in the presence of high religiosity, 
high corporate performance and lower sensitivity of CEO’s compensation to stock 
volatility. Results documented in the paper are both statistically and economically 
significant: estimates from our main model indicate that a one-standard deviation 
increase in social capital results in a 126 basis points decrease in the propensity to 
undertake tax sheltering activities. 
This paper extends research on social capital (Jha and Chen, 2015; Jha, 2013; Jin 
et al., 2015; Guiso et al. 2004; Jha and Cox, 2015) and improves our understanding of the 
effect of the social environment on managerial decision (Hilary and Hui 2009, McGuire 
et al. 2012, Callen et al. 2016; Chircop et al., 2016). Importantly, by studying the relation 































































between social capital and tax avoidance, we add to the recent debate on companies’ 
perception of the desirability of tax avoidance activities from a social viewpoint (Davis et 
al. 2016). By documenting that firms headquartered in regions with high levels of trust 
and altruism engage less in tax avoidance activities, this study corroborate the idea that 
paying a fair amount of taxes is perceived as socially responsible.  
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We use Wilson’s (2009) sheltering probability to proxy for tax avoidance. We use 
the regression model reported in Wilson (2009, Table 5, Column 3). The sheltering 
probability equation is: 
 
_	
= −4.86 + 5.20		
 + 4.08		 − 0.41		+ 0.76		 + 3.51			 + 1.72		 !"#$	%$& '"+ 2.43		& 
  
where SHELTER_PROBit is the sheltering probability for firm i in year t; BTDit is 
the book-tax difference measure (Kim et al., 2011); DAit is discretionary accruals 
from the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones Model; LEVit is firm 
leverage; ATit is the log of total assets for firm i in year t; ROAit is return on assets; 
FOREIGN INCOMEit is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years that report 
foreign income, and 0 otherwise; and R&Dit is the research and development 
expense ratio. Following Kim et al. (2011), we define BTD as book income less 
taxable income scaled by lagged assets (AT). Book income is pretax income (PI) in 
year t. Taxable income is the sum of current federal tax expense (TXFED) and 
current foreign tax expense (TXFO) divided by the statutory tax rate and then 
subtracting the change in net operating loss carry forwards (TLCF) in year t. When 
current federal tax expense is missing, then total current tax expense is calculated 
by subtracting deferred taxes (TXDI), state income taxes (TXS), and other income 
taxes (TXO) from total income taxes (TXT) in year t. We use the standardized 
transformation of the variable.  
DD_BT 
 
DD_BT is equal to µi + εit from the following firm fixed-effect regression: 

+, = )*+, + 5+ + 4+,where BTit is the Manzon and Plesko (2002) book-tax 
difference measure; TAit is Dechow et al. (1995) total accruals measure for firm i in 
year t, scaled by the lagged total assets; µi is the average value of the residual for 
firm i over the sample period; and εit is the difference between the residual in year t 
and firm i’s average residual. BT is defined as (U.S. domestic financial income – 
U.S. domestic taxable income/ 
Income taxes (State) - Income taxes (Other) - Equity in Earnings)/lagged assets = 
(PIDOM - TXFED/Statutory tax rate - TXS - TXO - ESUB)/ATt_1. following line 
with prior literature, (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala ,2006), and include only firm-
years with positive TXFED. 
CETR 
CETR is defined as cash tax paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax book income (PI) less 
special items (SPI). CETR is set as missing when the denominator is 0 or negative. 
CETR is truncated to take a value between 0 and 1. 
SK 
SK is social capital measured at the county level and publicly available from the 
Northeast Regional Centre for Rural Development 
http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/social-capital-resources. Missing values for 
years in our sample period are filled by inter/extra polation. 
































































Absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i, year t, where discretionary 
accruals are computed using the modified Jones model including lagged PPE as an 
additional independent variable; 
IO Institutional ownership for firm i, year t, defined as the fraction of a firm’s 
outstanding shares owned by institutional investors; 
CASH Cash holding for firm i, year t, defined as cash and marketable securities (CHE) 
divided by lagged assets (AT); 
ROA Return on assets for firm i, year t, measured as operating income (PI - XI) scaled by 
lagged assets (AT); 
LEV 
Leverage for firm i, year t, measured as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged 
assets (AT); 
NOL A dummy variable coded as 1 if loss carry forward (TLCF) for firm i is positive as 
of the beginning of the year t; 
CHG_NOL Change in loss carry forward (TLCF) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (AT); 
FI Foreign income (PIFO) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (AT). Missing 
values in PIFO are set to 0; 
PPE 
Property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets 
(AT); 
INTANG Intangible assets (INTAN) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (AT); 
EQINC Equity income in earnings (ESUB) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (AT); 
R&D 
Research and development expense ratio for firm i, year t, measured as research and 
development expense (XRD) scaled by lagged assets (AT). Missing values in XRD 
are set to 0; 
EMP The natural logarithm of the number of employees (EMP) for firm i, year t; 
CHG_SALE Changes in sales (SALE) scaled by lagged sales for firm i, year t; 
SIZE The logarithm transformation of the market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) for 
firm i at the beginning of year t; and 
MB Market-to-book ratio for firm i, at the beginning of year t, measured as market value 
of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO), scaled by book value of equity (CEQ). 
EDU 
Percentage of people 25 years and above who have a bachelor’s, postgraduate or 
professional degree in the county.  Data from US Census Bureau. Missing data for 
years in our sample period derived by inter/extra polation. 
INC Median household income in county. Data from US Census Bureau. Missing data 
for years in our sample period derived by inter/extra polation. 
POV 
People of all ages in poverty in county expressed as a percentage. Data from US 
Census Bureau. Missing data for years in our sample period derived by inter/extra 
polation. 
POP 
An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the population for the county is 
above the sample median and 0 otherwise. Data on county resident population from 
US Census Bureau. Missing data for years in our sample period derived by 
inter/extra polation. 































































Table 1: Sample distribution 
This table shows the distribution of observations over the sample period, 1990-2014. 
 
Year No. Percent Cum. 
        
1990 2,378 4.49 4.49 
1991 2,371 4.48 8.97 
1992 2,318 4.38 13.34 
1993 2,157 4.07 17.42 
1994 2,123 4.01 21.42 
1995 2,143 4.05 25.47 
1996 2,329 4.40 29.87 
1997 2,450 4.63 34.49 
1998 2,506 4.73 39.23 
1999 2,416 4.56 43.79 
2000 2,415 4.56 48.35 
2001 2,321 4.38 52.73 
2002 2,203 4.16 56.89 
2003 2,132 4.03 60.92 
2004 2,050 3.87 64.79 
2005 2,029 3.83 68.62 
2006 1,984 3.75 72.36 
2007 1,928 3.64 76.00 
2008 1,888 3.56 79.57 
2009 1,824 3.44 83.01 
2010 1,772 3.35 86.36 
2011 1,762 3.33 89.69 
2012 1,799 3.40 93.08 
2013 1,848 3.49 96.57 
2014 1,816 3.43 100 
        
Total 52,962 100   































































Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis 
over the sample period, 1990-2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Variable n p25 mean p50 p75 sd 
              
SHELTER 52962 -0.501 0.000 -0.433 -0.102 1.000 
SK 52962 -1.222 -0.584 -0.579 0.051 0.805 
DA 52962 0.030 0.165 0.076 0.184 0.225 
IO 52962 0.000 0.238 0.040 0.473 0.300 
CASH 52962 0.028 0.198 0.103 0.293 0.225 
ROA 52962 -0.089 -0.030 0.048 0.130 0.271 
LEV 52962 0.000 0.175 0.098 0.284 0.204 
NOL 52962 0.000 0.592 1.000 1.000 0.491 
CHG_NOL 52962 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.055 0.228 
FI 52962 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.018 
PPE 52962 0.088 0.274 0.201 0.390 0.234 
INTANG 52962 0.000 0.129 0.035 0.201 0.180 
EQINC 52962 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.070 
R&D 52962 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.072 0.089 
EMP 52962 4.963 6.613 6.636 8.269 2.161 
CHG_SALE 52962 -0.035 0.133 0.079 0.234 0.317 
SIZE 52962 3.224 4.899 4.885 6.534 2.167 
MB 52962 1.071 2.814 1.965 3.572 2.879 
EDU 52962 25.567 32.234 30.500 39.220 9.284 
INC 52962 10.563 10.760 10.746 10.962 0.276 
POV 52962 7.100 10.866 10.300 14.200 4.673 
POP 52962 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 0.500 
 




































































DA -0.071 -0.078 1.000
0.000 0.000
IO 0.296 0.039 -0.132 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
CASH -0.160 -0.054 0.132 -0.040 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.208 0.076 -0.289 0.297 -0.110 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LEV 0.191 -0.010 0.009 0.034 -0.274 -0.002 1.000
0.000 0.025 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.661
NOL 0.025 -0.093 0.187 -0.112 0.112 -0.385 0.038 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CHG_NOL -0.163 -0.065 0.255 -0.208 0.189 -0.703 -0.027 0.275 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FI 0.329 -0.024 -0.020 0.257 0.004 0.234 -0.001 0.053 -0.140 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.746 0.000 0.000
PPE 0.137 -0.015 -0.045 0.072 -0.280 0.160 0.358 -0.183 -0.118 -0.043 1.000
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
INTANG 0.204 -0.015 0.013 0.077 -0.122 0.050 0.222 0.129 -0.040 0.117 -0.190 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EQINC 0.233 0.008 -0.033 0.100 -0.109 0.110 0.088 -0.035 -0.086 0.128 0.095 0.039 1.000
0.000 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R&D -0.157 -0.029 0.183 -0.096 0.473 -0.394 -0.172 0.241 0.373 -0.009 -0.291 -0.087 -0.110 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000
EMP 0.620 0.074 -0.271 0.469 -0.280 0.491 0.219 -0.226 -0.389 0.321 0.224 0.199 0.191 -0.332 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CHG_SALE -0.035 -0.029 0.088 -0.014 0.185 0.048 0.110 -0.003 0.038 0.006 0.124 0.137 -0.018 0.096 -0.033 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE 0.675 -0.014 -0.143 0.492 0.002 0.360 0.117 -0.104 -0.226 0.372 0.122 0.228 0.189 -0.083 0.758 0.056 1.000
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MB 0.042 -0.014 0.049 0.016 0.243 -0.030 -0.051 0.040 0.126 0.073 -0.038 0.030 -0.018 0.215 -0.031 0.201 0.251 1.000
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EDU 0.095 0.254 0.083 0.018 0.222 -0.095 -0.076 0.209 0.083 0.094 -0.253 0.153 -0.038 0.208 -0.012 0.007 0.139 0.083 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.112 0.000 0.000
INC 0.061 -0.031 0.103 0.054 0.238 -0.112 -0.087 0.242 0.100 0.096 -0.269 0.166 -0.039 0.227 -0.044 0.000 0.127 0.064 0.671 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.966 0.000 0.000 0.000
POV 0.026 -0.165 -0.034 0.012 -0.143 0.047 0.068 -0.065 -0.046 -0.017 0.176 -0.050 0.059 -0.189 0.042 0.005 -0.011 -0.039 -0.345 -0.634 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
POP 0.008 -0.312 0.020 -0.021 0.087 -0.038 -0.047 0.046 0.036 0.038 -0.081 0.010 -0.002 0.069 -0.037 0.017 0.022 0.025 0.075 0.009 0.271 1.000
0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.596 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
This table shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analysis over the sample period, 1990-2014. All 















































































Table 4: Main findings 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** 
indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  SHELTER 
Variable Coeff. Sig. T-value 
        
SK -0.016 *** -5.18 
DA 0.156 *** 6.83 
IO -0.234 *** -9.94 
CASH -0.223 *** -13.70 
ROA -0.297 *** -9.34 
LEV 0.115 ** 2.72 
NOL 0.177 *** 19.72 
CHG_NOL -0.015   -0.84 
FI 4.246 *** 26.49 
PPE -0.083 *** -3.31 
INTANG 0.089 *** 3.68 
EQINC 1.006 *** 16.08 
R&D -0.300 *** -5.68 
EMP 0.149 *** 13.77 
CHG_SALE -0.095 *** -8.48 
SIZE 0.208 *** 24.40 
MB -0.015 *** -7.07 
EDU 0.005 *** 23.66 
INC -0.075 *** -6.41 
POV 0.001 * 2.04 
POP -0.005   -0.80 
Constant -0.925 *** -4.79 
        
Industry F.E Yes 
Year F.E Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes 
        
Observations 52962 
R-squared 0.572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.571 
 































































Table 5: Alternative proxies for tax avoidance 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
substitute the dependent variable with alternative proxies for tax avoidance activity. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** 
indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  DD_BT   CETR 
Variable Coeff. Sig. T-value   Coeff. Sig. T-value 
                
SK -0.001 ** -2.49   0.005  *** 4.68 
DA -0.006 ** -2.29   -0.004   -0.70 
IO 0.000   -0.16   0.001   0.23 
CASH 0.008 ** 2.40   -0.028  *** -4.76 
ROA 0.099 *** 9.87   0.104  *** 8.47 
LEV 0.001   0.19   -0.039  *** -6.48 
NOL 0.009 *** 9.30   -0.092  *** -28.74 
CHG_NOL -0.032 *** -3.30   0.074  *** 6.86 
FI -0.132 *** -4.76   -0.126  * -2.04 
PPE -0.001   -0.20   -0.056  *** -8.87 
INTANG 0.009 ** 2.33   0.004   0.47 
EQINC -0.009 ** -2.27   -0.024  ** -2.70 
R&D -0.015   -1.48   -0.229  *** -12.90 
EMP 0.001   1.58   0.009  *** 9.61 
CHG_SALE -0.013 *** -3.80   -0.057 *** -9.95 
SIZE -0.002 *** -3.43   0.004 *** 4.43 
MB -0.001 *** -5.07   -0.003 *** -5.67 
EDU 0.000   0.58   0.000 *** -3.14 
INC -0.002   -0.52   -0.003   -0.41 
POV 0.000   -1.14   0.000   1.37 
POP 0.001   1.54   0.005 *** 2.96 
Constant 0.115 ** 2.34   0.152 * 1.89 
                
Industry F.E Yes   Yes 
Year F.E Yes   Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes   Yes 
                
Observations 13082   30725 
R-squared 0.083   0.216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.076   0.214 
 































































Table 6: State fixed effects 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
include state fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are 
clustered by year. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
  SHELTER 
Variable Coeff.  Sig. T-value 
        
SK -0.029 *** -5.76 
DA 0.153 *** 6.81 
IO -0.230 *** -9.85 
CASH -0.214 *** -13.55 
ROA -0.287 *** -9.40 
LEV 0.111 ** 2.69 
NOL 0.180 *** 19.88 
CHG_NOL -0.014   -0.79 
FI 4.153 *** 24.95 
PPE -0.094 *** -3.92 
INTANG 0.087 *** 3.46 
EQINC 0.996 *** 16.19 
R&D -0.182 *** -3.53 
EMP 0.152 *** 13.89 
CHG_SALE -0.097 *** -8.89 
SIZE 0.209 *** 24.73 
MB -0.015 *** -7.17 
EDU 0.005 *** 14.92 
INC -0.124 *** -7.81 
POV -0.001   -1.03 
POP -0.014 * -1.78 
Constant -0.416   . 
        
Industry F.E Yes 
Year F.E Yes 
State F.E. Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes 
        
Observations 52962 
R-squared 0.578 
Adjusted R-squared 0.576 
 































































Table 7: CEO attributes 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
include controls for CEO attributes. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard 
errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
 
  SHELTER 
Variable Coeff. Sig. T-value 
        
SK -0.065 *** -8.58 
FEMALE 0.036   1.21 
AGE -0.081 ** -2.43 
DA 0.069 ** 2.60 
IO -0.210 *** -16.47 
CASH 0.228 *** 5.05 
ROA -0.717 *** -9.20 
LEV 0.436 *** 7.57 
NOL 0.160 *** 16.85 
CHG_NOL 0.112   0.95 
FI 0.228   1.10 
PPE -0.176 *** -5.19 
INTANG 0.117 ** 2.27 
EQINC 0.595 *** 10.51 
R&D 0.650 *** 3.32 
EMP 0.384 *** 22.57 
CHG_SALE 0.016   0.51 
SIZE 0.506 *** 21.46 
MB -0.045 *** -10.74 
EDU 0.010 *** 20.23 
INC -0.030   -0.94 
POV 0.008 *** 7.33 
POP -0.016   -1.29 
Constant -4.110 *** -8.37 
        
Industry F.E Yes 
Year F.E Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes 
        
Observations 15365 
R-squared 0.731 
Adjusted R-squared 0.729 
 































































Table 8: Corporate governance 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
include controls for corporate governance. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
 
  SHELTER 
Variable Coeff. Sig. T-value 
        
SK -0.062 *** -5.99 
HIGH_CGOV 0.113 *** 3.01 
DA 0.021   0.50 
IO -0.186 *** -8.44 
CASH 0.079   1.68 
ROA -0.849 *** -8.48 
LEV 0.450 *** 7.40 
NOL 0.124 *** 8.97 
CHG_NOL -0.200 *** -3.93 
FI 0.269   0.96 
PPE -0.127 ** -2.74 
INTANG -0.017   -0.34 
EQINC 0.620 *** 8.93 
R&D -0.074   -0.37 
EMP 0.318 *** 17.75 
CHG_SALE 0.067 ** 2.27 
SIZE 0.581 *** 21.79 
MB -0.037 *** -9.42 
EDU 0.010 *** 10.42 
INC -0.100 *** -2.96 
POV 0.004 *** 3.21 
POP -0.050 *** -3.75 
Constant -4.059 *** -9.94 
        
Industry F.E Yes 
Year F.E Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes 
        
Observations 12686 
R-squared 0.748 
Adjusted R-squared 0.746 































































Table 9: Religiosity 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
interact social capital with religiosity All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard 
errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
 
  SHELTER 
Variable Coeff.  Sig. T-value 
        
SK*REL -0.029 *** -4.83 
SK -0.003   -0.68 
REL 0.003   0.67 
DA 0.155 *** 6.87 
IO -0.233 *** -9.95 
CASH -0.221 *** -13.38 
ROA -0.297 *** -9.38 
LEV 0.115 ** 2.73 
NOL 0.177 *** 19.71 
CHG_NOL -0.015   -0.84 
FI 4.242 *** 26.35 
PPE -0.082 *** -3.31 
INTANG 0.090 *** 3.72 
EQINC 1.003 *** 16.26 
R&D -0.285 *** -5.55 
EMP 0.149 *** 13.73 
CHG_SALE -0.095 *** -8.52 
SIZE 0.209 *** 24.41 
MB -0.015 *** -7.06 
EDU 0.005 *** 24.61 
INC -0.082 *** -7.36 
POV 0.000   0.66 
POP -0.002   -0.38 
Constant -0.870 *** -4.70 
        
Industry F.E Yes 
Year F.E Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes 
        
Observations 52962 
R-squared 0.572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.571 
 































































Table 10: Corporate performance 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
interact social capital with corporate performance All variables are defined in Appendix 
1. Standard errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
 
  SHELTER 
Variable Coeff. Sig. T-value 
        
SK*HIGH_ROA -0.045 *** -6.79 
SK -0.005   -1.38 
HIGH_ROA -0.095 *** -8.89 
DA 0.188 *** 7.90 
IO -0.241 *** -10.39 
CASH -0.248 *** -14.48 
LEV 0.122 ** 2.60 
NOL 0.188 *** 18.44 
CHG_NOL 0.146 *** 6.89 
FI 4.101 *** 24.69 
PPE -0.093 *** -3.34 
INTANG 0.083 *** 3.52 
EQINC 0.991 *** 15.71 
R&D -0.173 *** -3.98 
EMP 0.141 *** 14.06 
CHG_SALE -0.101 *** -9.84 
SIZE 0.210 *** 25.89 
MB -0.014 *** -7.00 
EDU 0.005 *** 22.36 
INC -0.083 *** -7.16 
POV 0.001 * 1.74 
POP -0.005   -0.81 
Constant -0.811 *** -4.15 
        
Industry F.E Yes 
Year F.E Yes 
S.E. clustered by year Yes 
        
Observations 52962 
R-squared 0.57 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 
 































































Table 11: CEO compensation 
This table shows the results for Equation 2 over the sample period, 1990-2014 when we 
interact social capital with CEO compensation All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are clustered by year. *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
 
    SHELTER 
Variable   Coeff. Sig. T-value 
          
SK*HIGH_CASHCOMP   -0.022 * -1.95 
SK   -0.050 *** -5.68 
High_CASHCOMP   -0.176 *** -13.21 
DA   0.065 ** 2.48 
IO   -0.208 *** -18.41 
CASH   0.190 *** 4.87 
ROA   -0.695 *** -9.17 
LEV   0.413 *** 7.44 
NOL   0.145 *** 16.03 
CHG_NOL   0.103   1.03 
FI   -0.018   -0.09 
PPE   -0.174 *** -5.57 
INTANG   0.082   1.58 
EQINC   0.585 *** 12.30 
R&D   0.547 *** 2.98 
EMP   0.383 *** 21.99 
CHG_SALE   0.023   0.80 
SIZE   0.479 *** 20.84 
MB   -0.045 *** -10.95 
EDU   0.010 *** 17.67 
INC   -0.028   -0.87 
POV   0.007 *** 7.14 
POP   -0.018   -1.47 
Constant   -4.208 *** -10.77 
          
Industry F.E   Yes 
Year F.E   Yes 
S.E. clustered by year   Yes 
          
Observations   15906 
R-squared   0.733 
Adjusted R-squared   0.732 
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